Breaking: Ksi Lisims LNG should be named a Project of National Liability not of National Interest

A flaring stack at the LNG Canada plant in Kitimat. Production there will exceed Canadian guidelines for nitrogen dioxide. Photo via BC Energy Regulator.

Richard Brooks wrote this excellent article on the dangers of the Ksi Lisims LNG project. It is reposted with permission.

November 12, 2025

The Ksi Lisims LNG project in British Columbia is being presented as a "Project of National Interest." However, a serious analysis of its legal, financial, and operational realities reveals a project facing profound and escalating risks.

This isn’t a "Project of National Interest” – it’s a project of national liability with profound, unaddressed legal conflicts, fundamentally flawed market timing, and speculative financials. It poses a clear liability to investors and a direct threat to Indigenous rights and Canada's climate commitments.

For any potential financier, investor, or policymaker, a sober look at the data is warranted.

1. The Legal Gauntlet

The project's most immediate and significant risk is its failure to secure Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). This is a clear requirement under B.C.’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (DRIPA).

• Consent has not been granted by the Lax Kw’alaams, Metlakatla, Kitsumkalumk, or Gitxalaat.

• This lack of consent was so significant it was formally noted in the B.C. government's own Environmental Assessment certificate.

  
  

This failure has already moved from a risk to an active legal liability. As of October 2025:

• The Lax Kw'alaams Band and Metlakatla First Nation have each separately challenged the project's federal approval in federal court.

• Both nations also have separate, ongoing title claims in the B.C. Supreme Court related to the area.

• The Gitanyow Hereditary Chiefs' challenge (over threats to salmon and climate and failure to consult) is pending a decision on appeal.

• The Council of the Haida Nation has declared their opposition to the 160 new LNG tanker voyages that would come with the project.

  
  

2. The Financials: A Market Mismatch

The project's financial case is on equally shaky ground, defined by an inexperienced developer and a fundamental misreading of the global market.

• Inexperience & Costs: The key Texas-based proponent, Western LNG, has no track record of successfully building any major project. They are projecting costs at an outdated ~$550-600/MTPA. Independent analysis from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) places the actual cost at $1,200–$1,900/MTPA—a 200-300% discrepancy.

• Building for a Glut: Ksi Lisims LNG is targeting a 2028 launch, directly into a massive global supply glut. Major projects from Qatar, Australia, and the US Gulf Coast are coming online faster and will flood the market. Industry leaders are sounding the alarm: Shell's CEO has expressed "surprise" at the rush, and Gulfstream Services, Inc. LNG's CEO called the market "irrational."  Bloomberg has reported extensively on this global LNG glut.

• Who's Buying?: The entire business case rests on "insatiable Asian demand." Let's check in on that, shall we? China: The biggest target, has experienced 11 months of declining LNG demand and is actively diversifying away from expensive seaborne LNG. Why? Because they have cheaper piped gas from Russia and Central Asia and their renewables build out, particularly solar which is faster to build out, is meeting growing electricity demand. South Korea & Japan: These are mature, saturated markets with flat-to-declining demand as they pivot to renewables and restart nuclear. India: A potential growth market, but an extremely price-sensitive one that won't lock in the high-cost, long-term contracts this project needs to even service its debt. It is likely India will skip gas and move to solar as Pakistan has done.

With two-thirds of its capacity unsold, this is a purely speculative venture, led by an inexperienced developer, trying to sell a high-cost product into a flooded market where its main customers are disappearing.

3. The Pipeline Liability

The project is entirely dependent on the 900km Rupert Gas Transmission (PRGT) pipeline, which is a massive liability in itself.

• Its cost has already doubled to $10-12 billion before construction.

• This mirrors the debacle of the Coastal Gaslink Pipeline Ltd project, which ballooned from a C$4B estimate to C$14.5 billion.

• The PRGT is also facing multiple court challenges (from Gitxsan Hereditary Chiefs, the Skeena Watershed Conservation Coalition, and others) over its permit and route.

4. The "Net Zero" Promise

Finally, the project's "net zero" pledge—a legally enforceable condition—appears unrealistic.

• There is no electricity supply agreement with BC Hydro Hydro.

• The 100km transmission line required is unfunded and could take 10 years to build.

• The project must compete for this limited power against other mining projects, LNG proposals, and the basic needs of B.C. residents.

• The project will export 33 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions per year and be powered by the burning of methane gas for years. Let's not even mention the flaring and methane leaks from the terminal and pipeline. 

The interests being served here are those of foreign gas companies, the execs at an unproven shell company Western LNG LLC and the billionaires at US private equity fund managers Blackstone and Apollo Global Management, Inc.

Based on the legal, financial and market risks - and the massive costs - over $20 billion for the LNG terminal and associated gas pipeline - Ksi Lisims should be called a Project of National Liability - not a project of national interest. 

Richard Brooks is a Climate Finance Leader | Program Director | Advancing Climate Action & Solutions | Strategic Advisor to NGOs & Foundations | Board Director